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Abstract
Network shares and retail prices are not symmetric in the telecommu-
nications market with multiple bottlenecks which give rise to new questions
of access fee regulation. In this paper we consider a model with two types
of asymmetry arising from different entry timing, i.e. a larger reputation
for the incumbent and lower cost of servicing for the entrant as a result
of more advanced technology. As a result firms have divergent preferences
over the access fee. In case of linear and non-linear prices the access fee
might still act as the instrument of collusion, but only if a side-payment
is permitted which is generally welfare decreasing. Moreover, in contrast
with the European regulatory framework, the access fee on the basis of
termination cost might not necessarily be a socially preferable solution.
JEL Classification: L11, L13, L51, L96
Keywords: cost asymmetry, brand loyalty, imperfect competition,
network interconnection, access fee
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the deregulation of telecommunications - formerly seen
as a natural monopoly - plays an important role within policy and in economic
literature. In this paper we focus on mobile telephony, particularly in the EU,
which operated as a monopoly until the early 1990s and since then has func-
tioned as an oligopoly1. At the beginning of the millennium a new framework
for communications networks was introduced which was designed to harmonize
European regulation in order to reduce entry barriers and facilitate effective
competition for, the benefit of consumers. Under the new regulatory regime,
each country is required to establish a national regulatory authority to mon-
itor competition in communications markets and to define the relevant market
segments. Furthermore they are to decide whether an operator has significant
market power (SMP) in a particular segment and to assess the appropriate reg-
ulatory obligations. On the basis of an EU communications directive on access
∗The author thanks Mark Armstrong, Gergely Csorba, Ferenc Forgó, András Gömöri and
Maarten Janssen for their comments and recommendations. The paper has also benefited
from the presentations at the Tinbergen Institute, at the Frankfurt Summer School on Digital
Pricing and at my home university.
†Corvinus University of Budapest and Tinbergen Institute. Address: Tinbergen Institute,
Roetersstraat 31, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: kocsis@tinbergen.nl
1For the evolution of mobile telecommunications in Europe see Gruber (2001) and Gruber
and Verboven (2001).
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and interconnection, the wholesale mobile voice call termination has already
been defined as a relevant market in most of the European countries, since each
operator is a monopolistic provider for its respective bottleneck and charges an
access fee for usage2. In the resent years, the access fee for call termination
was freely negotiated between firms; however under the new regulatory frame-
work the termination charge set by the SMP operators is controlled. Currently
transitional methodologies are used and within a few years, an access fee regu-
lated on the basis of long-run incremental cost (LRIC) will be introduced. The
LRIC is a forward-looking methodology which measures the additional cost an
operator incurs to provide termination on its network.
Several asymmetries can be observed on the telecommunications market.
These asymmetries require an individual consideration of each firm with regard
to regulation. In this paper, we focus on two types of asymmetry. Liberal-
izing the telephony market has provided opportunity for new entry and as a
consequence resulted in asymmetries among firms entering the market early
(incumbent) and late (entrant). The reasons for this may be as follows: first,
the entrant had the opportunity to introduce a more recent technology which
implies a lower cost of servicing (i.e. supply side advantage). On the other
hand the incumbent who entered the market earlier may gain an extra advant-
age because of reliability or reputation for quality, realized in the form of extra
utility for those consumers who wished to subscribe for the incumbent’s ser-
vices (i.e. demand side advantage or brand loyalty). This extra utility can be
reckoned as a switching cost because if a consumer subscribed to the incumbent
wants to switch network, he has to face additional costs like the administrat-
ive cost of switching or the reimbursement of discounts resulting from a longer
contract or buying a new cellular device. In the presence of this type of cost,
a consumer is willing to change between networks only if the additional cost of
switching is smaller than the extra surplus gained from the other firm’s lower
price. However, because of the learning process of consumers about the quality
of the operators, and as a consequence of competition, the additional incentives
to innovate and to reduce costs, the brand loyalty and the cost advantage might
diminish over time which may result in more symmetric competition.
Thus all these asymmetries, together with rapidly developing technologies
call for a reconsideration of the role of the regulatory mechanism. The follow-
ing questions arise: is the cost-based access fee tenable, or do other ways of
asymmetric or symmetric access price regulation seem reasonable? What is the
effect of access price regulation on firms’ profit and on consumer surplus?
In this paper, we seek to find the answer to these questions in the presence
of brand loyalty, cost asymmetry and linear demand. We formalize a mar-
ket with two firms competing for consumers with horizontally differentiated
products. The firms are interconnected: they have to pay a two-way access
fee for call termination; each firm maximizes its profit charging retail price(s)
simultaneously and non-cooperatively. First we present Armstrong’s (2002)
model as a benchmark case, however we focus more on the supply side (cost)
asymmetry, the equilibrium conditions and the comparative statics. The most
2The most pertinent and normative European (tele)communications authority is Ofcom
(formerly Oftel) in the UK. For more details in accordance with the EU harmonization across
cellular markets see Ofcom (2004).
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relevant paper related to cost asymmetry is Armstrong (2002) in which the au-
thor considers a market where each consumer makes one unit of calls to every
other consumer. He also assumes that the advantage of the incumbent resulting
from its reputation outweighs the cost advantage of the entrant. In this case
the incumbent always has a larger market share. As a policy implication he
derives that the firms have divergent preferences over the access fee. The total
industry profit changes in the same direction as the incumbent’s larger profit,
so that a side payment to the entrant might compensate for an access fee which
is against the entrant’s interest. The larger the retail price, the smaller the con-
sumer surplus; however, because of the inelastic demand, the increment in the
industry profit is equal to the decrease in the consumer surplus, thus resulting
in welfare-neutrality of the equilibrium.
To complement Armstrong’s results, in case of extremely large asymmetry
we find that the firm which has larger advantage over the other firm can corner
the market and drive out its rival. In contrast to Armstrong’s case, if the cost
asymmetry exceeds the demand side asymmetry, as a result of an access fee
change, the industry profit varies with the entrant’s profit, creating the oppor-
tunity for the entrant to set its access fee larger than its marginal termination
cost and compensate the incumbent for its profit loss. Consumer surplus varies
opposite to the industry profit and welfare remains unchanged.
In the second part of the paper, we extend this model to linear demand
for telephony consumption and to uniform linear retail prices. Since the access
profits do not cancel out, we find quartic and asymmetric first derivatives,
therefore the main results arise from simulations. The equilibrium exists if the
difference between access fees is sufficiently small and the networks are weak
substitutes. For strong substitution, price competition is unstable since the
firms try to undercut each other more intensively and so corner the market.
Studying the effect of different access fees under strong supply side asymmetry,
we find similar results to the unit consumption case; however, the welfare-
neutrality property of the equilibrium no longer holds true: welfare generally
varies with consumer surplus. For stronger brand loyalty, firms prefer the same
access fee difference, possibly resulting in a negative access mark-up for the
entrant.
Finally, we extend the model to the case of competition in two-part tariffs,
where each firm sets a uniform per-minute charge and a fixed fee at the same
time. Firms set their per-minute prices equal to their perceived marginal costs
and compete for the consumers with fixed fees, while trying to extract as much
of the consumer surplus as possible. We find that independently of asymmetry,
the firms’ preferences over the access fee are divergent, and therefore they might
negotiate a termination charge which is preferable for one of the firms, since this
also increases industry profit. In the case of small cost asymmetry, a positive
access mark-up for the entrant favors both the entrant itself and consumers.
However for larger cost asymmetry the rise in access fee lowers the consumer
surplus.
This paper is an extension of the common symmetric models of network
interconnection and competition. The first articles published on this topic are
Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. (1998a), in which the authors analyze the
problem of two-way access pricing in the set up of a symmetric cost structure,
uniform pricing and reciprocal (equal) access fee. They claim that for small
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access markup and poor network substitution, there is a unique, symmetric
and stable equilibrium, while on the other hand, if network services are strong
substitutes, then no equilibrium exists. The main and principally cited results
of their articles are that (i) under linear retail pricing, the price increases in
the access fee and therefore, the access fee may be an instrument of collusion,
and (ii) under two-part tariffs, the profit is independent of the access fee. If
termination-based price discrimination is considered in the model, as Laffont
et al. (1998b) shows, then under linear prices it is only possible for the access
fee to be the instrument of collusion in the case of weak substitution; however
in the case of two-part tariffs, firms will agree on a cost-based access fee thus
bringing price discrimination to an end.
The profit-neutrality property is confirmed in a more general set up by
Dessein (2004) and Hahn (2004), who assume consumer heterogeneity in terms
of demand for calls and calling pattern.
In Carter and Wright (1999), Carter and Wright (2003) and Peitz (2005)
the authors consider an asymmetric market in the presence of brand loyalty
and leave the other segments (for instance costs) symmetric. In the case of
reciprocal access fees, that is the same access fee for each firm, Carter and
Wright state that if the market shares are symmetric, the firms are indifferent
with regard to the access fee. Otherwise the firm with brand loyalty prefers a
cost-based access fee and if brand loyalty is sufficiently strong, the other firm
has the same preference. Moreover the cost-based access fee is in most cases
socially optimal. Peitz emphasizes the use of a non-reciprocal access fee, since
an asymmetric access price regulation which allows positive access mark-up for
the entrant can be socially more desirable: it favors the entrant and increases
consumer surplus at the same time.
In de Bijl and Peitz (2002) and de Bijl and Peitz (2004), the authors focus
on the same type of asymmetry although they analyze the market in a dynamic
set up and use simulation to derive policy implications. They find that inde-
pendently of the type of access price regulation, the asymmetry among firms
lessens over time; the entrant’s profit and the consumer surplus increase and
finally a symmetric equilibrium emerges. In their (2004) article, they extend
their model with asymmetrical marginal costs and derive similar results from
the simulations to those they found previously.
The structure of the present paper is as follows. In Section 2, we define
all the terms and conditions which are used in the paper and then present
Armstrong’s model as a benchmark case. In Section 3, we extend his model to
competition with uniform linear tariffs under linear demand for calls; in Section
4, we derive the equilibrium for non-linear tariffs. In Section 5, we conclude.
The proofs are shown in Appendix A and simulation results in Appendix B.
2 Benchmark case: unit consumption
First we present the stylized model from Armstrong (2002), in which he assumes
a market with unit telephony consumption and seeks to find arguments in
the interest of implementing a non-reciprocal access fee. Since in his article
Armstrong considers a market in which demand side asymmetry outweighs
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supply side asymmetry and these asymmetries cannot show extreme values,
in this section we focus more on supply side asymmetry, the conditions and
comparative statics of the equilibrium. Moreover the proof of the equilibrium
will be shown in the Appendix.
Furthermore, this section defines the most important terms and introduces
the assumptions used in this paper; other versions presented will be expressed
in terms of deviation from this set up.
2.1 Cost structure and access fee
Consider a market with two networks indexed by i = 1, 2. We name firm 1
as incumbent and firm 2 as entrant to make a distinction according to their
reputation and costs, though we analyze a simultaneous move game. To avoid
Bertrand competition and to measure the effect of different pricing schemes
on market shares, we assume that firms compete for consumers by means of a
horizontally differentiated service on a segment [0, 1], that is we consider the
model for product differentiation a la Hotelling (1929). We assume maximal
product differentiation, namely the firms are located at the two ends of the
segment (x1 = 0, x2 = 1). Each firm incurs three types of costs:
(i) connection independent cost. For instance this could be, the fee for a
license or the cost of building-up and improving facilities. These costs will be
considered in the model as sunk costs.
(ii) connection dependent but traffic independent cost. This is the fixed
cost fi of serving a consumer, and without loss of generality we assume that
the fixed cost is the same for both firms, i.e. f1 = f2 = f .
(iii) traffic dependent cost. This is a unit cost ciO of originating and ciT of
terminating a call. For simplicity we assume that ciO = ciT = c0i . We define
the cost asymmetry in the level of marginal costs which is the difference in
termination costs. Assume that firm 2, the entrant, is more efficient, i.e.
0 ≤ c02 < c01.
Denote Ci ≡ 2c0i + fi and ∆c ≡ c02 − c01.
The networks are interconnected which means that if a consumer subscribed
to a firm originates a call, this call may be terminated on the rival firm’s net-
work. In this case, the firm has to purchase access to ensure that its subscribers
are able to call all consumers independently of service provider and therefore,
the firm has to pay an access fee for each unit call terminated on the rival’s
network. In the model network i charges a per-unit access charge τ i for termin-
ating its rival’s off-net call and pays τ j per-unit fee to network j for terminating
its off-net call on network j. We assume that the access fee is not a decision
variable of the firm and can be determined by negotiation among the firms or
by the government. Hereafter denote ∆τ ≡ τ2 − τ1.
On the basis of the above definitions the unit cost of a call depending on its
termination can be determined. If a call is originated and terminated on the
same network (i.e. on-net call), say in network i, the total unit cost is equal
to ci ≡ 2c0i . However if a call is originated in network i but terminated on
network j (i.e. off-net call), network i incurs a unit cost of c0i + τ j , and if a
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call of network j is terminated on network i, network i’s unit cost is equal to
c0i − τ i.
2.2 Demand structure and consumer surplus
A consumer decides about connecting to a network, and then consumes one
unit of the service independently of price, or in other words, the demand for
consumption is inelastic. Consumers are homogeneous in the sense that each
consumer gains the same fixed surplus of being connected (v0). On the other
hand, the consumers are heterogeneous since they have different a priori prefer-
ences: a consumer values a service more when it is ’closer’ to his preference. Let
x denote the characteristic (location) of the consumer on the segment [0, 1] and
assume that the consumers are uniformly distributed on this segment. As the
preference of a consumer is different from the characteristics of service supplied
by the networks (i.e. different location), the consumer has to pay ’transporta-
tion cost’ (t > 0) which cost measures the disutility of not being a consumer of
the ideal firm. The larger t, the more differentiated the networks are, that is
the less strong the substitutability between networks. We assume that t is the
same for all consumers and the total transportation cost is a linear function of
the distance.
Therefore the total utility of a consumer is
v0 − t |x− xi|+ tβi − pi,
where
1. v0 is assumed to be high enough to provide full consumer participation in
the market, in case of unit consumption that is
v0 > t
µ
2− β1 + β2
2
¶
+
C1 + C2
2
− ∆
τ
3
µ
β +
2∆c
t
¶
2. the second term indicates the total transportation cost since the consumer
travels a distance of |x− xi|, where xi denotes the location of the firm
which can be 0 or 1
3. βi is the extra utility a consumer receives when subscribed to network i
(i.e. brand loyalty or switching cost). Assume that β ≡ β1−β2 > 0, that
is that the incumbent has stronger reputation on the market. The second
and the third terms together measure the consumer’s network specific
utility.
4. pi denotes the uniform retail price set by firm i. A price is uniform if a
company does not differentiate prices depending on which network a call
is terminated on.
Since consumers are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], in order to find the op-
timal proportion of consumers in each network, we aim at finding the consumer
who is indifferent to being a subscriber of network 1 or being one of network 2.
A consumer located in α is indifferent to the networks if
v0 − tα+ tβ − p1 = v0 − t(1− α)− p2.
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Then α, the market share of firm 1, is equal to
α(p1, p2) =
1 + β
2
+ σ(p2 − p1),
where σ = 12t is the measure of substitution. The inverse ratio between σ and
t means that the larger the transportation cost, i.e. the more ’painful’ it is
to be further from the ideal network, the weaker the substitution between the
networks. Denote αi firm i’s market share; in addition we know that αi is a
function of the prices and α1+α2 = 1. When the prices are equal, if 0 ≤ β ≤ 1
the market shares are non-negative; if β = 0, then the market is symmetric;
if β > 0, then the incumbent has a larger market share, and in the extreme
case of β = 1, the entrant has no chance to extract any subscriber from the
incumbent.
In the model, we use the assumption of balanced calling pattern which means
that every consumer initiates the same number of calls he receives. This implies
that in case of homogenous consumers, the fraction of calls originating in a
network which terminate on the other network is proportional to the latter
network’s market share.
2.3 Price competition
Before defining the firms’ optimization problem, we illustrate the firms’ benefits
and costs in the next figure.
 
NETWORK 1 
(share: α1) 
NETWORK 2 
(share: α2) 
ON-NET CALLS 
Profit from calls: 
222
2
2 )( qcp −α  
Profit from subscription: 
)( 12 fm −α  
OFF-NET CALLS 
Revenue: )( 211121 qqp ταα +  
Cost: ])[( 2
0
11
0
1221 qcqc ++ταα  
Revenue: )( 122221 qqp ταα +  
Cost: ])[( 1
0
22
0
2121 qcqc ++ταα  
ON-NET CALLS 
Profit from calls: 
111
2
1 )( qcp −α  
Profit from subscription: 
)( 11 fm −α  
Figure 1. Costs and revenues in a market of interconnection and competition.
The figure indicates all the parameters and variables which are used in the
most general model of this paper. In the current model each consumer buys
one unit of call (that is q1 = q2 = 1) and pays only price pi for it (that is mi = 0
exogenous). In the first extension the demand is linear (qi ≥ 0) and firm i sets
a linear price pi ≥ 0 while mi = 0 exogenous. In the last model firm i sets a
two-part tariff so that its consumers have to pay a per-minute charge pi ≥ 0
and a fixed fee mi ≥ 0. As a result of balanced calling pattern and consumer
homogeneity in terms of demand, firm i originates the α2i share of on-net calls
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and the αiαj share of off-net calls, and terminates the αiαj share of off-net calls
as well.
Since the access fee is given by negotiation or set by the government, we
model the market as a noncooperative game in strategic form and seek to find
a unique Nash-equilibrium3. There are two firms in the market (i = 1, 2) with
the previously described characteristics competing for consumers by choosing
a price profile s = (p1, p2). As it can be tracked from Figure 1, firm i has the
following profit function:
πi(s) = αi (pi − Ci)| {z }
retail profit
+ αiαj(τ i − τ j)| {z }
access profit
, (1)
where the first part measures the retail profit from telephony consumption and
the second part comprises benefits and costs derived from providing access to
its rival and using its rival’s facilities. Firm i maximizes its profit function (1)
by choosing a price pi given its rival’s price pj and subject to
0 ≤ pi,
0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, i = 1, 2.
0 ≤ πi,
Unlike the symmetric models of telecommunications, the asymmetry in the
profit function suggests that the equilibrium will not be symmetric. From
the first order conditions of the profit maximization, one obtains the following
Nash-equilibrium4.
Proposition 1 If
|∆τ | < 1
2σ
,
there exists an equilibrium which is unique, asymmetric and can be shared or
cornered.
If
|λ| < 3,
where λ ≡ β+4σ∆c, then the equilibrium is shared. Firm i sets price p∗i , gains
market share α∗i and profit π
∗
i which are the following:
p∗1 =
1
2σ
+
β
6σ
+
2C1 + C2
3
− ∆
τλ
3
, (2)
p∗2 =
1
2σ
− β
6σ
+
2C2 + C1
3
− ∆
τλ
3
, (3)
α∗1 =
1
2
+
1
6
λ, (4)
π∗i = (α
∗
i )
2
∙
1
σ
+ τ i − τ j
¸
. (5)
For large cost difference and strong substitution (that is λ < −3) the entrant
and for strong brand loyalty (that is λ > 3) the incumbent corners the market,
sets the above equilibrium price and serves the whole market.
3We seek to find the Nash-equilibrium which can be defined as in Vega-Redondo (2003),
p. 39.
4The proof is given in Appendix A.
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The proposition claims that the equilibrium exists and is unique if |∆τ | <
1/2σ; under this condition the second order conditions hold and therefore the
profit functions are strictly quasi-concave. Moreover, we find that 0 < r0i(·) < 1
and r0i(·) is constant which provides the single crossing property of the reaction
curves ri(pj). In accordance with this condition, the equilibrium exists if the
substitution between the networks is weak and the difference between the access
fees is small enough. The underlying intuitions are similar to the symmetric
model of Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. (1998a).
Armstrong in his 2002 model assumes that λ > 0, which means that the
incumbent’s advantage coming from larger brand loyalty is larger than the
entrant’s cost advantage. Moreover he dispenses with extreme asymmetries by
assuming that λ < 3. The current analysis considers the demand and sup-
ply side asymmetries, and examines the effect of extreme asymmetries on the
equilibrium.
The incumbent always sets a higher price because it faces higher termination
cost and benefits from stronger brand loyalty. However, since each firm has
an advantage over the other, if its advantage is strong enough, it can set a
price so as to drive out the other firm from the market. If brand loyalty is
very strong (β >> 3) or the cost difference is large and the substitution is
strong (4σ |∆c| >> 3), a monopoly outcome emerges: in the first case the
incumbent corners the market, in the latter the entrant. These conditions
are realized by extremely high parameter values which can only emerge in an
infant market. In general, when brand loyalty is less strong (β < 3) or the
cost difference is lower and the networks are weaker substitutes (4σ |∆c| < 3), a
shared-market equilibrium emerges. Henceforth we will eliminate the extreme
parameter values and focus on the shared-market outcomes.
Before generalizing the results, two special cases will be considered. If the
cost difference is equal to zero (that is firms are symmetric), in spite of its
higher price the incumbent receives larger market share, since from (2), (3) and
(4)
∆p ≡ p2 − p1 = −
β
3σ
< 0,
∆α ≡ α2 − α1 = −
β
3
< 0.
If the access fees are set on the basis of cost, the incumbent receives higher
profit. However if the entrant is allowed to set an access fee larger than the
termination cost to compensate for its disadvantage, it might occur that the
difference in access profits exceeds the difference in retail profits; therefore the
entrant gains higher profit.
In the special case of zero brand loyalty, the entrant sets a lower price and
attracts more subscribers:
∆p =
2∆c
3
< 0,
∆α = −4σ∆
c
3
> 0.
Following the same train of thought as before, in the case of cost-based access
fee the entrant receives higher profit; although if the incumbent may set an
access fee higher than its cost, it can realize higher profit.
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In general, when ∆c > 0 and β > 0, the entrant’s price is lower since
∆p = − β
3σ
+
2∆c
3
< 0,
however the market shares and the profits vary according to the intensity of
asymmetry; from (4):
∆α = −λ
3
,
thus
∆α < 0⇔ λ > 0.
The condition λ > 0 holds if brand loyalty is strong and for a given substitution
∆c is small or for a given ∆c the services are weak substitutes. As a result,
the incumbent obtains more subscribers. On the other hand, if β is small
and for a given substitution the cost difference is large or the networks are
strong substitutes, then λ < 0, causing a larger market share for the entrant.
As for the firms’ profit, the difference depends on the market shares and the
access mark-up: the stronger the brand loyalty or the smaller the cost difference
and the access mark-up, the more likely that the incumbent gets higher profit.
Otherwise the entrant is better off.
2.4 How access fee affects the equilibrium?
Following Armstrong’s idea, to derive a relation between the access fee, firms’
preferences and social preference, we analyze the effect of ∆τ on the equilibrium
prices and profits. As formula (5) shows, in an asymmetric market a firm with
higher market share which charges a higher access fee gets higher profit. Since
the market shares are independent of the access fee (see (4)), the larger ∆τ ,
the better for firm 2 and the worse for firm 1 which implies that the firms have
divergent preferences over the access fee. As for the whole industry, a marginal
change in the industry profit (π ≡ π1 + π2) is equal to
∂π
∂∆τ
=
∂π
∂τ2
= ∆α,
therefore if ∆α < 0, the industry prefers a smaller ∆τ , otherwise a larger ∆τ is
more favorable. If brand loyalty is strong, the incumbent has a higher market
share and as a result industry profit is decreasing in ∆τ . In a more symmetric
market where brand loyalty is weaker and the cost difference dominates, the
entrant has a higher market share. In this case, the total industry profit varies
in the same direction as the entrant’s profit: the larger ∆τ , the larger the
industry profit. Therefore in the first case the incumbent might compensate
the entrant with a side-payment in favor of setting a lower difference in access
fees, otherwise the entrant has the opportunity to choose a higher access fee
and compensate the incumbent.
The change in consumer surplus also depends on brand loyalty and cost
difference, but in the opposite way to before. Since
∂pi
∂∆τ
= − (β + 4σ∆c) ≡ −λ,
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if λ > 0 , then equilibrium prices are decreasing in ∆τ which favors consumers.
Otherwise the prices are increasing, thus lowering consumer surplus. This result
is intuitive since there is full consumer participation in the market. Moreover
since there is full participation on the market, the change in industry profit is
equal and opposite to the change in consumer surplus. Therefore the welfare,
which is equal to profits plus consumer surplus, does not vary with the access
fee. In other words, in case of unit consumption for a given market share the
total welfare is constant and since market shares do not depend on the access
fee, welfare is also independent of the access fee. The following proposition
summarizes the above results5.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the incumbent is subject to cost-based access fee.
The effect of a larger ∆τ is the following:
(i) Firms have divergent preference over the access fee. If brand loyalty is
strong (that is λ > 0), the incumbent’s profit varies in the same direction as
the industry profit which is decreasing in ∆τ , meaning a lower access fee for
the entrant. In this case the incumbent may compensate the entrant for a lower
access fee. If the cost difference is large (that is λ < 0), the industry profit
varies with the entrant’s profit, giving the opportunity to set a larger access fee
and compensate the incumbent.
(ii) Consumer surplus varies in the opposite direction to industry profit.
(iii) Welfare remains unchanged.
3 Linear demand and linear tariffs
In this section, we extend the previous model to a model with linear demand
for telephony consumption and seek an answer to the following questions: what
is the effect of cost asymmetry and brand loyalty on the equilibrium and its
properties? What are the preferences of the firms and the social planner over
the access fee?
3.1 Demand structure and consumer surplus
Since we relax the assumption of unit consumption and extend it to a linear
demand function, a consumer faces a two-step problem: in the first step he
decides on whether to connect to a network and in the second step he chooses
the amount of telephony consumption. We leave the first group of character-
istics of consumers as it was set in subsection 2.2, that is the fixed surplus v0,
the network specific surplus βi (and β ≡ β1 − β2 > 0) and different a priori
preferences with respect to the consumer’s location x and the ’traveling cost’ t.
Applying these assumptions, the total utility of a consumer subscribed to firm
i is equal to
v0 − t |x− xi|+ tβi + u(q)− piq,
where the sum of the first three terms measures the utility of being connected
(traffic independent surplus), and the sum of the last two terms measures the
5The proposition can be proved easily by the above argument.
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utility from telephony consumption (traffic dependent surplus): u(q) is the
utility from telephony consumption q assumed to be the same for all consumers
and pi denotes the uniform linear price of firm i.
We can solve the consumer’s two-step problem by backward induction. In
the second step, given the retail prices, a consumer decides about telephony
consumption. His utility function is considered quadratic, i.e.6
u(q) = q − q
2
2
,
therefore his demand function for telephony consumption is linear:
q(p) = 1− p.
As a consequence, the variable net surplus gained from consumption is as fol-
lows:
v(p) = max
q
{u(q)− pq} = (1− p)
2
2
.
In the first step a consumer chooses a network. The optimal network share of
firms can be determined by finding a consumer, located in α, who is indifferent
between the networks, that is
v0 − tα+ tβ + v(p1) = v0 − t(1− α) + v(p2).
Then α, the network share of firm 1, is
α(p1, p2) =
1 + β
2
+ σ [v(p1)− v(p2)] ,
where σ = 12t is the measure of substitution. Introduce the notation vi ≡ v(pi),
qi ≡ q(pi) and denote αi firm i’s market share which is a function of the retail
prices.
For a given s = (p1, p2) strategy profile the total consumer surplus can be
defined in the following way:
S(s) = α1v1 + α2v2 −D (α1) ,
where D(α) measures the average disutility originating from the difference
between the a priori preferences of consumers and the characteristics of services
offered by the networks. Or in other words, the function D(·) is the average
traveling cost between the location of consumers and firms which is for any α
equal to
D(α) =
1
2σ
∙
α
α
2
+ (1− α)1− α
2
¸
=
1
2σ
∙
α2 + (1− α)2
2
¸
.
6We use a simple quadratic utility function because it fulfils the general assumptions;
moreover it makes the analysis easier since a linear demand function can be derived from the
first order condition of utility maximization. We might also set up a more general model using
the utility function u(q) = aq−b q2
2
, however this generality does not modify the main results.
12
3.2 Price competition
The basic characteristics of firms remain the same as were presented in sub-
section 2.1. We look for the Nash-equilibrium of a static game in which firms
(i = 1, 2) compete for consumers by setting a price profile s = (p1, p2). As can
be seen from Figure 1 and recalling that mi = 0, firm i’s profit is equal to
πi(s) = αi [(pi − ci) qi − f ] + αiαj
£
(τ i − c0i )qj − (τ j − c0i )qi
¤
. (6)
In the Nash-equilibrium, firm i maximizes its profit function (6) according to
its price pi given the rival’s price pj , subject to
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1,
0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, i = 1, 2.
0 ≤ πi,
Since the access profit depends on αiαjqi which is a fifth-degree function of
pi, the first derivatives of the profit function are quartic, and therefore - and
only in case of linear prices - it is not possible to find a closed form solution
for the reaction functions and for the equilibrium prices. Moreover, the second
derivatives are cubic which makes the specification of equilibrium conditions
very complicated. To avoid this calculation problem, we ran simulations7, and
from the results we derive conclusions about the existence of the equilibrium
and about policy implications.
3.3 Comparison and policy implications
We find that for very large access fee difference and very strong substitution,
there exists no equilibrium, which is a robust result of Armstrong (1998) and
Laffont et al. (1998a).
Similarly to the unit consumption case, a firm with enormous advantage
over the other firm might corner the market. Denote ∆v ≡ v2 − v1. Monopoly
equilibrium can emerge, if one of the following conditions holds:
v1 −
1− β
2σ
≥ v2 ⇔ ∆v ≤ −
1− β
2σ
or
v1 +
β
2σ
≥ v2 −
1
2σ
⇔ ∆v ≥ 1 + β
2σ
In the first case the incumbent drives out the other firm from the market, in
the second the entrant. Because of the same reason as in the benchmark case,
the entrant always charges a lower price; therefore its consumers realize higher
variable net surplus. Since ∆v > 0, the first condition fulfils if β >> 1, that
is strong brand loyalty, and the second condition holds if for a given β, |∆c| is
sufficiently large. The cornering conditions require extreme parameter values;
therefore we will solely focus on the more general cases, namely the shared-
market equilibria.
We can draw up other characteristics of the equilibrium. Equilibrium prices
are decreasing in substitution between the networks, that is the stronger the
7For simulations we used Mathematica 5.0.
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substitution, the smaller the prices, which means that the stronger substitution
stimulates competition, thus lowering firms’ profit and causing smaller network
share for the incumbent (the effect of brand loyalty becomes weaker and the
effect of the cost difference becomes stronger). Moreover, from a welfare point
of view, it is preferable to have more fierce competition in the market (see
Figures 2 and 3 in Appendix B.1).
The further brand loyalty and the cost difference are from zero, the further
the equilibrium is from the symmetric case. Since the two effects of different
timing of entry are opposite, we need to separate them so as to compare the
outcomes. As the data shows, the entrant’s profit is generally higher than
the incumbent’s profit. For a given degree of brand loyalty, the smaller the
cost difference, the larger the incumbent’s profit and the smaller the entrant’s
profit, though the resultant is ambiguous just as is the change in consumer
surplus and welfare. However for stronger brand loyalty, the equilibrium price
difference becomes larger, and therefore the incumbent’s market share and profit
decrease, while the entrant’s profit increases. The consumer surplus varies
opposite to the industry profit. In a more asymmetric market the welfare
increases with the industry profit; however in a more symmetric market the
effect of∆τ on consumers surplus is stronger than on the industry profit, thereby
causing higher welfare (see Figures 4 and 5 in Appendix B.1).
The most important and most controversial point in the analysis is the
determination of the access fee. As we discussed in the introduction, the relevant
questions are whether to impose cost-based access fee regulation, or allow freely
negotiated access fee and for the less efficient firm to set an access fee containing
a positive mark-up. As before, the main results for policy makers are derived
from simulations (see Figures 6-11 in Appendix B.2).
Let us use the difference in access fees (∆τ ) for the policy implications, and
assume that the incumbent is subject to a cost-based access fee. When brand
loyalty is relatively small compared to the cost difference, that is to say strong
supply side asymmetry is present, then the equilibrium prices increase in ∆τ .
As a consequence, the net surplus a consumer receives decreases, thus lowering
consumer surplus (see Figures 6 and 7).
The intuition behind the increasing equilibrium prices is the following. If
∆τ increases (that is a larger τ2), for a given market share the incumbent has to
face a larger per-consumer access deficit (or smaller access profit); therefore the
total access profit can be reduced by decreasing the product of market shares
(α1α2). Since α1α2 is smaller if the difference in market shares is larger, the
incumbent is interested in moving away from the symmetric case which can be
achieved by a higher retail price. The entrant has the same preference over
its own price change. The entrant wants to lower the net outflow of calls to
raise the per-consumer access profit, which can be obtained by charging a higher
retail price. As a consequence the entrant gets higher per-consumer retail profit,
and since the incumbent is interested in lowering its market share, the entrant
obtains higher total retail profit.
Despite the increasing prices, if ∆τ is larger, the entrant with the lower cost
receives higher and increasing equilibrium profit, while the incumbent gets lower
and decreasing profit. This means that the firms have divergent preferences
over the access fee (see Figures 8-10). The industry profit changes in the same
direction as the entrant’s profit, thus obtaining similar result to Armstrong’s:
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the entrant can offer a side-payment for the less efficient firm to compensate
for a larger ∆τ .
Up to now we have analyzed the case of zero brand loyalty. However, where
demand side asymmetry exceeds cost asymmetry, the stronger the brand loy-
alty, the larger the incumbent’s retail price and the smaller the entrant’s price
compared to the case of zero brand loyalty; moreover the prices become mono-
tone decreasing function of ∆τ . Therefore, the overall effect of increasing ∆τ
on consumer surplus is positive. As a result of the decreasing prices, not only
the incumbent’s profit but also the entrant’s profit is decreasing, resulting in a
lower industry profit. In this case firms have similar preference over the access
fee, that is a smaller ∆τ , which may result in a negative access mark-up for the
entrant.
Welfare changes in the same direction as consumer surplus, meaning that
under low brand loyalty a larger ∆τ , otherwise a smaller ∆τ is more favorable
(see Figure 11).
4 Linear demand and two-part tariffs
This section analyzes network interconnection and competition in two-part tar-
iffs. In the symmetric models of Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. (1998a),
they obtain a profit-neutrality result, i.e. the firms’ profit is independent of
the access fee and equal to the Hotelling-profit. Since the firms are indifferent
over the access fee, the zero access mark-up (i.e. cost-based access fee) which
is the socially optimal solution might be carried through. In this section, we
look for the equilibrium in the presence of network asymmetry, and answer the
question of whether the profit-neutrality property still holds and if not, what
the socially preferable access charge would be.
4.1 Demand structure and consumer surplus
The consumers’ utility and demand functions are the same as those set in
Section 3. However in the present model each network offers a two-part tariff,
therefore a consumer of network i making q units of call pays
Ti(q) = mi + piq,
where mi is the fixed fee, e.g. the monthly charge of usage, and pi is the
per-minute charge. As a consequence, the net surplus a consumer obtains sub-
scribing to network i is equal to
w(pi,mi) = v(pi)−mi.
The network shares can be determined by finding the consumer, located in
α, who is indifferent between the two networks. This indifference means that
w(p1,m1)− tα+ tβ = w(p2,m2)− t(1− α).
From this expression, firm 1’s network share is
αˆ1(sˆ) =
1 + β
2
+ σ [w(p1,m1)− w(p2,m2)] ,
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where σ = 12t is the measure of substitution and sˆ = (p1,m1, p2,m2) is a
possible price profile of the firms. Henceforth denote vi ≡ v(pi), qi ≡ q(pi),
wi ≡ w(pi,mi) and
α1 ≡ α (w1, w2) =
1 + β
2
+ σ(w1 −w2).
For a given sˆ strategy profile the consumer surplus is the following:
S(sˆ) = αˆ1(sˆ)w1 + αˆ2(sˆ)w2 −D [αˆ1(sˆ)] ,
where D(α) measures the average disutility originating from the difference
between the a priori preferences and the characteristics of services.
4.2 Price competition
Firm i’s benefits and costs can be read from Figure 1, and the profit is as follows
πi(sˆ) = αˆi(sˆ) [(pi − ci) qi +mi − f ] + αˆi(sˆ)αˆj(sˆ)
£¡
τ i − c0i
¢
qj −
¡
τ j − c0i
¢
qi
¤
.
To simplify the profit maximization, we rewrite the profit function of firm i using
a modified strategy profile s = (p1, w1, p2, w2). Since with this modification
the market share αi is the function of (w1, w2), the profit function becomes
quadratic in pi, :
πi(s) = αi [(pi − ci) qi + vi − wi − f ] + αiαj
£
(τ i − c0i )qj − (τ j − c0i )qi
¤
. (7)
Hereafter denote Ai ≡ (τ i − c0i )qj − (τ j − c0i )qi firm i’s per-consumer access
profit.
We intend to find the Nash-equilibrium, in which each firm maximizes its
profit functions (7) according to its price and the offered net surplus simultan-
eously, subject to
0 ≤ pi,≤ 1,
0 ≤ wi, i = 1, 2.
0 ≤ αi ≤ 1,
0 ≤ πi,
The first order conditions of profit maximization are
∂πi
∂pi
= αi
£
−pi + ci + αj(τ j − c0i )
¤
= 0
and
∂πi
∂wi
= σ
h
(pi − ci)qi + vi − f − wi −
αi
σ
− 2σ(wi − wj)Ai
i
= 0.
The first order condition according to wi is quartic, therefore the equilibrium
cannot be given in the regular closed form. However, the first order condition
according to pi is linear for non-negative market shares; therefore the following
proposition can be claimed about the equilibrium and its properties8.
8The proof is given in Appendix A.
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Proposition 3 If
|Ai| < 1σ
for i = 1, 2, there is an equilibrium which is unique and characterized as
pi = ci + αj
¡
τ j − c0i
¢
, (8)
mi = f +
αi
σ
− αj
¡
τ j − c0i
¢
qi + (αi − αj)Ai, (9)
α1 =
1
2
+
β
6
+
σ
3
[v1 − v2 +α2
¡
τ2 − c02
¢
q1 −α1
¡
τ1 − c01
¢
q2+∆
c (α1q1 + α2q2)],
πi = α2i
∙
1
σ
+Ai
¸
.
We get first best retail prices (8) since they are equal to the perceived
marginal cost of a unit call, that is the marginal cost of an on-net call (αi2c0i )
plus the marginal cost of an off-net call (αj(τ j+c0i )). In this case, each firm sets
its retail price as if it maximized the total surplus, therefore the firm behaves as
a monopoly over the determination of the fixed fee. Therefore the fixed fee (9)
extracts the consumer surplus and covers the fixed cost and is modified (either
reduced or raised) with the access profit. If the access profit is high enough, the
fixed fee can be negative which can be seen very often in practice. A typical
example for this situation is the device subsidy.
4.3 Comparison and policy implications
We start comparing the results in case of cost-based access fee and then we
extend the analysis to a particular situation when the entrant is allowed to
charge a higher access fee than its termination cost (τ2 − c02 > 0).
First we redefine the equilibrium to the case of a cost-based access fee,
substituting τ i = c0i , that is
pi = ci + αj
¡
c0j − c0i
¢
, (10)
mi = f + αi
∙
1
σ
−
¡
c0j − c0i
¢
qi
¸
,
α1 =
1
2
+
β
6
+
σ
3
[v1 − v2 +∆c (α1q1 + α2q2)],
πi = α2i
∙
1
σ
−
¡
c0j − c0i
¢
qi
¸
.
For the comparison denote ∆p ≡ p2 − p1,∆q ≡ q2 − q1,∆v ≡ v2 − v1,∆m ≡
m2 −m1,∆α ≡ α2 − α1 and ∆π ≡ π2 − π1. The difference between the equi-
librium per-minute prices is equal to the cost difference (∆p = ∆c), i.e. the
incumbent with the larger cost charges a larger per-minute price. As a con-
sequence, the consumers of the incumbent initiate less calls (∆q = −∆c) thus
obtaining lower net surplus. When the entrant’s access fee increases, firm 1’s
perceived marginal cost increases, therefore it sets a more higher per-minute
price (∆p = ∆c − α2(τ2 − c02) < 0).
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Since each firm charges its perceived marginal cost as a retail price, it gets
zero profit from calls originating in its network; therefore the profit arises from
the connection dependent profit and from the incoming calls. The difference in
equilibrium profits is closely related to the difference in fixed fees, which in the
case of a cost-based access fee is equal to
∆m =
∆α
σ
+∆c (α1q1 + α2q2) . (11)
This expression can be either negative or positive, and since the second part
of (11) is always negative, the sign of (11) depends on which firm has a larger
market share.
As for the market shares, the difference varies in response to the strength
of brand loyalty and the cost difference in the following way:
∆α =
−β − 4σ∆c (1− α1c1 − α2c2)
3 + σ (∆c)2
. (12)
The denominator of (12) is always positive, and therefore the entrant has a
higher market share only if the numerator is also positive. Let us start from
zero cost difference. In case of symmetric costs only brand loyalty has an effect
on market shares, and in spite of its higher per-minute price, the incumbent
obtains higher market share (∆α = −β/3 < 0). If ∆α < 0 and ∆c = 0, then
∆m < 0, meaning that the incumbent sets a higher fixed fee. The behavior of
firm 1 is straightforward: it faces a positive per-consumer access profit; therefore
it can increase its total access profit by raising the product of market shares
(α1α2). This product is maximal if firms are symmetric, that is α1α2 = 1/4.
Firm 1 can enlarge this product by reducing its (larger) market share by means
of a higher access fee.
In case of zero brand loyalty, for reasonably low termination costs (α1c01 +
α2c02 < 1), the numerator of (12) is positive, causing higher market share for
the entrant (∆α = −4σ∆c (1− α1c1 − α2c2) /(3 + σ (∆c)2) > 0). The intuition
is similar to the linear pricing case. Since the entrant faces a negative per-
consumer access profit, it is interested in lowering the total access profit and
raising the total retail profit, that is moving further from the symmetric case
through a higher market share. A higher market share can be obtained by
simply setting a lower price or by charging a lower fixed fee at the same time.
Therefore if β = 0, it is not obvious which firm sets a higher fixed fee: ∆m
depends on how cost difference and brand loyalty relate to each other. For
a given brand loyalty, the larger the cost difference, the higher the entrant’s
market share and the more likely that it charges a higher fixed fee.
The same argument can be applied to the difference between π2 and π1
which is equal to
∆π =
∆α
σ
+∆c
¡
α21q1 + α
2
2q2
¢
.
If the entrant can slightly deviate from the cost-based access fee, a small
access mark-up does not affect the equilibrium market shares9, therefore the
above results remain unchanged.
In a neighborhood of cost-based access fee ∂αi/∂τ2 = 0 holds. Applying
this shows that the effect of the increment in τ2 on equilibrium profits can be
9The proof is similar to lemma 1’s proof in Peitz (2005), p. 356.
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measured by the following derivatives:
∂π1
∂τ2
¯¯¯¯
τ2=c02
= α21 (α2∆
c − q1) < 0,
∂π2
∂τ2
¯¯¯¯
τ2=c02
= α22q1 > 0.
Using these expressions, we state that profit-neutrality of the symmetric equi-
librium no longer holds: the incumbent’s profit decreases and the entrant’s
profit increases in response to an increase in τ2. If the termination costs are
the same, then each firm’s profit depends solely on its market share. Therefore
the industry profit changes in the same direction as that of the larger firm,
which is in this case the incumbent. The larger the cost difference, the larger
the entrant’s market share, thus the more likely that the industry profit varies
in the same direction as the entrant’s profit. As a consequence, we find that
in case of zero cost difference, the access mark-up favors the entrant, and for a
larger cost difference it favors the industry also.
As Peitz (2005) claims in case of symmetric costs, the consumer surplus
increases as the entrant is allowed to use an access mark-up. This result holds
true if the cost difference remains small: an increase in τ2 is followed by a larger
consumer surplus, though the consumer surplus is lower than that of zero cost
difference. However for large cost differences the consumers are worse off.
The previous results are summarized in the following proposition10:
Proposition 4 In case of symmetric costs, in a neighborhood around cost-based
access prices an increase in the entrant’s access price gives rise to higher profit
for the entrant and higher consumer surplus. With increasing cost differences,
the industry profit might also increase though it leads to a smaller consumer
surplus.
5 Conclusions
In the present paper, we analyzed network interconnection and competition un-
der two different types of asymmetry, namely a demand side advantage emerging
from the incumbent’s stronger reputation or the lack of information about the
entrant’s servicing quality and a supply side advantage, that is the entrant’s
lower marginal cost. In contrast to the symmetric model, in most cases the
firms have divergent preferences over the access fee difference. As preceding
papers show, in case of a demand side asymmetry, a firm which entered the
market later might set an access fee larger than its termination cost thus res-
ulting a higher profit and consumer surplus. Emphasizing a stronger supply
side asymmetry, we find that a positive access markup can make the consumers
worse off.
As the results show, the access fee regulated on the basis of termination
cost might not necessarily provide the socially preferable solution. In case of an
infant market, when the incumbent derives advantage from earlier presence in
10The proof is given in Appendix A.
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the market, an access mark-up for the entrant may increase consumer surplus
and welfare. However in a more symmetric market when the importance of the
incumbent’s reputation is eliminated, a cost-based access fee or even a negative
mark-up for the entrant might provide a socially optimal outcome. As for the
implementation of these results, it would be required to report precisely the
costs and have a reliable estimate for the incumbent’s advantage.
This paper presented a model for mobile telephony where operators have
full coverage. The two-way access pricing is also applicable in local telecommu-
nications and in the dynamically developing Internet market. However in these
markets operators do not always establish their own network therefore they
provide services through the rivals’ bottlenecks. In these cases an analysis ex-
tended to other types of entry, namely local-loop unbundling and carrier select,
would refine the results and their policy implications.
6 Appendices
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
The first order condition for firm i is
∂πi
∂pi
= −σ(pi −Ci) +
µ
1± β
2
+ σ(pj − pi)
¶
+ σ [2σ(pj − pi)± β] (τ i − τ j) = 0,
where the upper sign of β applies to firm 1, and the lower to firm 2. From this
first order condition firm i’s reaction curve is
r1(p2) =
(1 + 2σ(τ1 − τ2)) p2 +C1 + (1 + β)/2σ − β∆τ
2 (1 + σ(τ1 − τ2))
,
r2(p1) =
(1 + 2σ(τ2 − τ1)) p1 +C2 + (1− β)/2σ − β∆τ
2 (1 + σ(τ2 − τ1))
.
Since
∂ri
∂pj
=
1 + 2σ(τ i − τ j)
2 (1 + σ(τ i − τ j))
,
each reaction curve is a monotonic function of the rival firm’s price (that is
firms are strategic complements) if and only if
τ j − τ i <
1
2σ
. (13)
Moreover the slope of the reaction function is constant and 0 < r0i(·) < 1 holds.
Therefore the reaction curves intersect only once in the relevant price range and
a unique equilibrium exists. The second derivatives are the following
∂2πi
∂p2i
= −2σ (1 + σ(τ i − τ j)) < 0
for i = 1, 2, which are negative if (13) holds. In this case the profit function is
strictly quasi-concave, so therefore it has a unique maximum.
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From the reaction curves the equilibrium prices, market shares and maximal
profits can be derived as follows:
p∗1 =
1
2σ
+
β
6σ
+
2C1 + C2
3
− ∆
τ
3
(β + 4σ∆c) (14)
p∗2 =
1
2σ
− β
6σ
+
2C2 + C1
3
− ∆
τ
3
(β + 4σ∆c) (15)
α∗1 =
1
2
+
1
6
(β + 4σ∆c)
π∗i = (α
∗
i )
2
∙
1
σ
+ τ i − τ j
¸
If (13) holds, the equilibrium prices and profits are positive.
Shared- or cornered-market outcome. (I) Suppose that firm 1 corners the
market and sets a low price such that (i) at this price the closest consumer to
firm 2 also wants to buy from firm 1, that is
v0 +
β
2σ
− 1
2σ
− p1 ≥ v0 − p2, (16)
and (ii) this price is a Nash-equilibrium price, since none of the firms wants to
unilaterally deviate from it. Substituting (14) and (15) into (16), we get the
condition for a cornered-market, that is
β + 4σ∆c ≥ 3.
Since ∆c < 0 and σ > 0, this condition holds if β >> 3. In this case firm 1 gets
positive profit, and firm 2 gets zero since it does not have any subscribers. If
firm 2 attempts to mimic firm 1 with the same price, it will achieve a positive
market share, but receives negative per-consumer profit. Therefore it is not
profitable to deviate from the equilibrium.
(II) Suppose now that only firm 2 attains subscribers. It can be possible for
an equilibrium price p2 which satisfies the following condition:
v0 +
β
2σ
− p1 ≤ v0 −
1
2σ
− p2.
This condition in the equilibrium holds if and only if
β + 4σ∆c ≤ −3,
that is 4σ |∆c| >> 3. We can now follow the same argument as in point (I).
(III) If
|β + 4σ∆c| < 3,
then the equilibrium market shares are positive, i.e. the shared market outcome
emerges.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that profit function (7) is twice continu-
ously differentiable. The first order conditions of profit maximizations are
∂πi
∂pi
= αi
£
−pi + ci + αj(τ j − c0i )
¤
= 0
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and
∂πi
∂wi
= σ
h
(pi − ci)qi + vi − f − wi −
αi
σ
− 2σ(wi − wj)Ai
i
= 0,
where Ai =
¡
τ i − c0i
¢
qj −
¡
τ j − c0i
¢
qi is firm i’s per-consumer access profit.
From these conditions we get the equilibrium values stated in the proposition:
pi = ci + αj
¡
τ j − c0i
¢
,
mi = f +
αi
σ
− αj
¡
τ j − c0i
¢
qi + (αi − αj)Ai,
α1 =
1
2
+
β
6
+
σ
3
[v1 − v2 + α2
¡
τ2 − c02
¢
q1 − α1
¡
τ1 − c01
¢
q2
+∆c (α1q1 + α2q2)],
πi = α
2
i
∙
1
σ
+Ai
¸
.
For the existence of the equilibrium, the following second order conditions
(SOCs) should hold:
(i)
∂2πi
∂p2i
= −αi < 0
which holds if αi > 0 and ∂2πi/∂p2i = 0 if firm j corners the market.
(ii)
∂2πi
∂w2i
= −2σ (1 + σAi) < 0⇔ |Ai| < 1σ
This expression states that the SOC according to wi holds if and only if for a
given σ the per-consumer access profit is small enough or if σ is small so that
there is weak substitution between the networks.
(iii) Since
∂2πi
∂pi∂wi
=
∂2πi
∂wi∂pi
= −σαi
¡
τ j − c0i
¢
,
therefore
∂2πi
∂p2i
∂2πi
∂w2i
>
µ
∂2πi
∂pi∂wi
¶2
⇔ αi
¡
τ j − c0i
¢2
< 2
µ
1
σ
+Ai
¶
.
This condition holds if brand loyalty is not very strong and τ i is close to c0i
which allows only a small access market.
Proof of Proposition 4. The structure of the proof originates in Peitz (2005)
who applied the methodology of supermodular games and monotone compar-
ative statics of the equilibrium.
Assume that firm 1 is subject to cost-based access fee, and firm 2 can freely
set its access charge. Substituting the equilibrium prices (10) into the modified
profit function (7) we find a pseudo-profit function:
πˆi(w1, w2, pj) = αi
¡
v
£
ci + αj
¡
τ j − c0i
¢¤
− wi − f + αj
¡
τ i − c0i
¢
qj
¢
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from which the first derivative according to wi is
∂πˆi
∂wi
= σ
¡
v
£
ci + αj
¡
τ j − c0i
¢¤
− wi − f + αj
¡
τ i − c0i
¢
qj
¢
+αi
¡
σ
¡
τ j − c0i
¢
q
£
ci + αj
¡
τ j − c0i
¢¤
− 1− σ
¡
τ i − c0i
¢
qj
¢
.
If the second derivative according to wj is positive, the slope of the pseudo-
reaction curve is positive (i.e. strategic complements), and if the second de-
rivative according to τ2 is also positive, the reaction curve moves outward in
response to an increase in τ2, which means that the net equilibrium surplus
increases with τ2.
First consider the first derivative of firm 1’s pseudo-profit:
∂πˆ1
∂w1
= σ
¡
v
£
c1 + α2
¡
τ2 − c01
¢¤
− w1 − f
¢
+α1
¡
σ
¡
τ2 − c01
¢
q
£
c1 + α2
¡
τ2 − c01
¢¤
− 1
¢
.
The second derivative according to w2 is equal to
∂2πˆ1
∂w1∂w2
= σ
¡
1− σ
¡
τ2 − c01
¢
q
£
c1 + α2
¡
τ2 − c01
¢¤¢
.
If the access mark-up is small so that c02 < τ2 < c
0
1, then the cross-derivative is
positive, which means that firm 1’s best response function is upward sloping.
This is also the case if τ2 < c02 < c
0
1 (there is a negative mark-up). A sufficient
condition for strategic complements is that τ2 < c01.
As for the other second derivative,
∂2πˆ1
∂w1∂τ2
= −σ
¡
∆αq
£
c1 + α2
¡
τ2 − c01
¢¤
+ α1α2
¡
τ2 − c01
¢¢
(17)
is positive if τ2 < c01 and ∆
α is negative: that is, the incumbent has a larger
market share. This can occur in case of small cost difference and strong brand
loyalty:
β + 4σ∆c (1− α1c1 − α2c2) > 0.
In this case firm 1’s reaction curve moves outward, therefore its consumers
benefit from a larger τ2.
Consider now firm 2’s first derivative function:
∂πˆ2
∂w2
= σ
¡
v [c2 − α1∆c]− w2 − f + α1
¡
τ2 − c02
¢
q1
¢
−α2
¡
σ∆cq [c2 − α1∆c] + 1 + σ
¡
τ2 − c02
¢
q1
¢
.
The cross-derivative according to w1 is equal to
∂2πˆ2
∂w2∂w1
= σ
¡
σ∆c (q1 + q [c2 − α1∆c]− α2) + 2σ
¡
τ2 − c02
¢
q1 + 1
¢
,
which is positive - in the neighborhood of cost-based access fee - if the cost
difference is small:
|∆c| < 2
¡
τ2 − c02
¢
q1 + 1σ
q1 + q [c2 − α1∆c]− α2
.
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The second derivative according to τ2 is equal to
∂2πˆ2
∂w2∂τ2
= −σ∆αq1, (18)
which is positive if the cost difference is small and brand loyalty is strong. The
larger the cost difference, the more likely the reaction curve moves inward.
As can be seen from (17) and (18)¯¯¯¯
∂2πˆ1
∂w1∂τ2
¯¯¯¯
<
¯¯¯¯
∂2πˆ2
∂w2∂τ2
¯¯¯¯
,
it is more likely that firm 1’s reaction curve moves inward. The overall effect of
τ2 on the consumer surplus depends on the size of ∆α. If ∆α > 0, both reaction
curves move inward thus lowering the total consumer surplus. If ∆α < 0, but
|∆α| < α1α2(τ2 − c01)/q1, only firm 1’s reaction curve moves inward, and the
effect of τ2 on w2 is always positive, though its effect on w1 is ambiguous: w1
can be lower or higher. However if ∆α < 0 and |∆α| > α1α2(τ2 − c01)/q1, both
reaction curves move outward yielding higher net surplus for every consumer.
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B Simulation results
In this section we show some results from simulations: first we illustrate a
comparison for different substitution and cost differences, then for different
access fees.
B.1 Comparison according to parameter values
In the following figures we present equilibrium profits (individual and industry,
πi and π ≡ π1+π2 respectively), consumer surplus (S) and welfare (W ≡ π+S)
for different values of the substitution parameter (σ), and for decreasing differ-
ence in termination costs (∆c) by different brand loyalty (β). For simplicity we
assume that the firms are subject to an access fee on the basis of termination
cost.
The effect of increasing strength of substitution:
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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π1 π2 π
Figure 2. Maximal individual and industry profit, increasing σ
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Figure 3. Consumer surplus and social welfare, increasing σ
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The effect of decreasing cost difference for different levels of brand loyalty
(grey curves show cases of β = 0, and black curves of β = .5):
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Figure 4. Maximal individual and industry profit, decreasing |∆c|
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Figure 5. Consumer surplus and social welfare, decreasing |∆c|
B.2 Comparison according to access fee
To compare the effect of different access fees, we fixed the following parameter
values
c01 = 0.02, c
0
2 = 0.01, σ = 10, f = 0, τ1 = 0.02.
In this case, the more efficient firm sets a cost-based access fee, and only firm
2’s access fee is changing. If ∆τ = 0, then the access fees are reciprocal, and
if ∆τ = −0, 01, both firms set a cost-based access fee. In the following figures
equilibrium prices (p∗i ), consumer surplus (S), profits (individual and industry,
πi and π ≡ π1+ π2 respectively) and social welfare (W ) are shown by different
values of brand loyalty (β). In the figures we indicate ∆τ on the horizontal axis
and the above mentioned equilibrium values on the vertical axis.
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Figure 6. Equilibrium prices, increasing ∆τ
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Figure 7. Consumer surplus, increasing ∆τ
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Figure 8. Maximal profit of firm 1, increasing ∆τ
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Figure 9. Maximal profit of firm 2, increasing ∆τ
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Figure 10. Maximal industry profit, increasing ∆τ
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Figure 11. Social welfare, increasing ∆τ
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